Abstract: Public policy may influence norms and preferences. By altering the payoffs associated with different preferences, public policy may influence the distribution of these preferences in the population. Such interdependence between policy and preferences may limit (or enhance) the effectiveness of different policies. We demonstrate this idea with a simple model of subsidizing contributions to a public good. While the short run effect of such a subsidy will be an increase in the overall contribution, the subsidy triggers an endogenous preference change that results in a lower level of contribution to the public good, despite the explicit monetary incentives to raise that level.
Introduction
Leaders, regimes and public policies change individuals, by influencing preferences and social norms. It would be naive to think that different regimes or policies trigger only modified behavior by the citizenry, without affecting who these citizens are: their preferences, aspirations and even their dreams.
1 Such interdependence between public policies and preferences is at odds with standard economic modeling which via the exogenous preferences assumption insists on "taking individuals as they are".
2
While neo-classical economics traditionally assumes that preferences are exogenous, economists have long recognized the malleability of individual preferences.
Half a century ago Harsanyi (1953 Harsanyi ( -1954 Aaron (1994) , Bowles (1998) and Marschak (1978) . John Stuart Mill argued "government itself should be evaluated in large measure by its effects on the character of the citizenry." (cited in Sunstein 1997, p. 20) 2 For a clear early statement of this approach see Stigler and Becker (1977) and Becker (1976) : "… all human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences…." has also been recognized. Referring to environmental policy questions, Sen (1995) writes:
"There are plenty of "social choice problems" in all this, but in analyzing them, we have to go beyond looking only for the best reflection of given preferences, or the most acceptable procedures for choices based on those preferences. We need to depart both from the assumption of given preferences (as in traditional social choice theory) and from the presumption that people are narrowly self-interested homo economicus (as in traditional public choice theory)."
Nevertheless, there has been no attempt to formally model the interdependence between public policy and individual preferences and its implication on the effectiveness of different public policies.
3 Building on the recent literature on the endogenous formation of preferences this paper develops such a model. We demonstrate how public policy, by altering the payoffs associated with different preferences, affects the dynamics of preference formation which in turn influence the efficacy of the public policy.
In recent years there is a growing literature that studies the endogenous formation of preferences. Preferences may evolve as a result of cultural transmission by which a socialization process transmits preferences across generations or through an imitation process by which individuals imitate other more "successful" individuals. 4 Such endogenous preference dynamics introduces a direct link between public policy and the 3 An important exception is a series of recent papers studying the interaction between legal policy and preferences. Huck (1998) analyzes the effects of the cost, effectiveness and outcome of a legal monitoring process on the evolution of remorse, and shows how legal institutions can be designed to encourage mutual trust. Similarly, Bohnet et al. (2001) show how a small probability of contract enforcement can "crowd-in" trustworthiness, or preferences for honesty, and thus lead to a higher probability of performance. And, BarGill and Fershtman (2004) study the effects of the legal remedy for breach of contract on the evolution of fairness norms and preferences among contracting parties. 4 Cultural transmission dynamics have been studied by Feldman (1973, 1981) , Boyd and Richerson (1985) and Verdier (1998, 2001) . For evolutionary models that endogenize preferences -see Basu (1995) , Bester and Güth (1998) , Dekel and Scotchmer (1999) , Weiss (1997,1998) , Guth and Yaari (1992) , Huck and Oechssler (1999) , Koçkesen, Ok and Sethi (2000a,b) , Possajennikov (2000) , Robson (1996) , and Rogers (1994) .
formation of preferences. Public policy changes the outcomes of the market interactions and thus affects the evolution of future preference profiles. 5 Moreover, the new distribution of preferences, or the altered social norm, may now affect the players' behavior and their reaction to the implemented public policy. Such interdependence between policies and preferences may limit (or enhance) the efficacy of public policies and thus influence the design of optimal policy.
We demonstrate this idea by considering a simple public good model in which contributions to the public good are encouraged by direct monetary subsidization.
Assuming endogenous preference dynamics we consider the effect of such government subsidization on the formation of preferences and consequently on the long run level of the public good. Individuals in this model are pair-wise matched and play a strategic game. The players' actions affect their direct payoffs and the aggregate action contributes to a public good they all commonly enjoy. Furthermore, the players may also care about their social status, which is determined by their relative contribution to the public good. However, all players do not necessarily share this concern for social status. We do not impose any preference profile; rather, we assume a selection process that determines the profile endogenously.
We then consider a subsidy policy aimed at promoting contributions to the public good. A short run analysis, in which preferences are exogenously given, indicates that such a subsidy indeed increases the equilibrium level of the public good. In the long run, 5 Such interdependence introduces also conceptual difficulties in studying, or defining, optimal public policies. The standard modeling approach is to define optimal policy with respect to an optimality criterion that ranks market outcomes given an exogenously specified profile of preferences. However, when public policy affects the evolution of preferences, the above selection procedure is no longer valid.
however, the subsidy policy induces a shift in the distribution of preferences, reducing the social incentives as well as the proportion of the population that cares about them.
Consequently, in our model the subsidy policy results in a lower level of the public good as the greater monetary incentives do not offset the disappearance of the social incentives.
Our emphasis is on social concerns, which are arguably more sensitive to the type of preference formation process that we consider. The importance of social rewards in providing incentives or compensation for individuals who perform activities with positive externalities was already suggested by Arrow (1971) . We emphasize the possible limits of standard monetary incentives in inducing activities that also provides social benefits.
We demonstrate how the use of monetary incentives may trigger an endogenous preference shift. This shift implies not only lower social incentives, but also a smaller proportion of individuals who care about social rewards.
The above result resembles a well-known argument in social psychology. In a controversial book, Titmuss (1970) 
Subsidizing a Public Good: Incentives and Preference Formation
We consider a population that interacts strategically. The action that each player chooses, besides affecting his direct private payoff, contributes to the accumulation of a public good and also determines the player's social status. Preferences, specifically preferences for social status, may change over time depending on the relative success of different types of individuals.
The Market Interaction
We follow Fershtman and Weiss (1997) 9 The change in preferences may indirectly influence the magnitude of the social rewards associated with contribution to the public good. See Section 2 (specifically equation (4)) below. where
. We further assume that
In addition to the direct payoff, the players' overall efforts contribute to a public good that they all commonly enjoy. Let ê be the total amount of effort in the population and let ( ) e Eˆ be a public good term such that ( ) ( ) 0
. We assume that N is sufficiently large such that the effect of i e on ê is negligible and each player views ê as fixed. Player i's overall payoff is:
We further assume that i e also determines the individual's social status. 11 Players, however, do not necessarily care about status. Some may simply maximize their economic payoffs (2), while others may value a high social status as well. We do not impose any preference profile but derive it endogenously. For simplicity, we allow for 10 To simplify calculations we assume that the public good term enters additively. 11 As is conventional in the endogenous preferences literature, we adopt a specific social preference -a preference for status. Our main point, however, is general: if a different social preference were assumed, a only two types of preferences: players that care about their social status and players who totally disregard it. Denoting the social reward by Σ , the utility of player i is: We further assume that only socially minded individuals can confer status on others. Under such an assumption the magnitude of the social incentives depends on the distribution of preferences in the population. 13 Specifically, the social component in
where σ is an exogenously given marginal social reward parameter. Substituting (2) and (4) into (3), we obtain the following expression for the utility of player idifferent model could be constructed where public policy affects the distribution of preferences in the population. 12 The social norm is also endogenously determined. If a group of individuals does not obey the norm, this will change the norm itself. 13 The notion is that an individual cares about his relative position, or status, because he cares about other individuals' opinion of him. In a society where individuals do not appreciate a certain trait or a certain behavior, possessing this trait or adopting this behavior would not be as important. Thus, when allowing for social preferences, the distribution of social and asocial types should affect the individual's utility function. 
We assume that the players' types are fully observable. We can now derive the equilibrium actions in the above game. Since there is a large number of players, individual players do not affect the public good term ) (e E , which can therefore be ignored in considering the game between each pair of players.
When the two players are of type 0, the payoff matrix in Figure 1 represents the game. This is a standard Prisoner's Dilemma game; at equilibrium, both players exert no effort and end up with ) , ( α α payoffs.
When a type 1 player is matched with a type 0 player, the game can be represented by the following payoff matrix: 14 In equilibrium, the type 0 player exerts no effort, whereas the effort exerted by the type 1 player depends on the magnitude of the σ q term. When 
, the game has two pure strategy equilbria, one equilibrium where both players exert no effort, and another equilibrium where both players exert effort. We assume that with some (strictly) positive probability the players manage to coordinate on the second equilibrium. 
Preference Dynamics
So far, we have assumed that part of the population indeed cares about status.
Intuitively, this is not surprising for most people would agree that status is an important consideration. 17 However, justifying preferences that differ from the standard homo economicus paradigm is not trivial.
18 15 Recall that the public good and the a e qσ terms have been omitted. 16 We ignore the mixed strategy equilibrium. Our results would not change were we to focus on the mixed strategy equilibrium instead (for our results to hold, all that is required is that when δ α σ γ β − < < − q the expected payoff of a type 1 player is greater than α ; this requirement is satisfied in the mixed strategy equilibrium). 17 Adam Smith (1776) wrote "Honour makes a great part of the reward of all honourable professions." (The Wealth of Nations, Book 1, ch. X, part1). Max Weber (1922) was the first to introduce social status as an important source of power. He defined status as "an effective claim to social esteem in terms of negative or positive privileges" [reprinted 1978, p.305] . 18 The main concern of the endogenous preferences literature has been to show that such preferences may still be the outcome of some preference dynamics and may survive the evolutionary process. For a derivation of the conditions under which "standard" preferences survive, see, e.g., Guth and Peleg (2001) . Let M(p,p',q) 
We assume general preference dynamics, which are monotonic in the monetary payoff. We therefore choose to be conservative and to assume that fitness is simply the We now characterize the stable preference profile and equilibrium actions given the status parameter σ . Note that since type 0 players never exert effort, the total effort ê is determined by the number of type 1 players who do exert effort.
Proposition 1:
(i) When (ii) When δ α σ γ β − < < − , the only stable preference profile is q = 1. All players exert effort; and thus, N e = .
(iii) When
, the unique evolutionary stable preference profile is
. Type 0 players exert no effort. Type 1 players always exert effort when matched with other type 1 players, but they exert effort only with probability ) (σ λ when matched with type 0 players. ) (σ λ is given by:
Hence, total effort in the population is:
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows:
(i) With weak status concerns the behavior of the two types of players are indistinguishable.
(ii) With intermediate status concerns, type 1 players, when matched with each other, sometimes exert effort, but they never exert effort when matched with type 0 players.
Hence, the monetary payoff of type 1 players exceeds that of type 0 players, and q rises until it reaches the only stable preference profile, q = 1.
(iii) With strong status concerns, the evolutionary stable population necessarily consists of both type 1 and type 0 players, where the stable distribution of preferences is determined as follows: If the proportion of type 1 players is too large, these players will always exert effort (even when matched with type 0 players), and therefore will earn lower payoffs than type 0 players, pushing down the proportion of type 1 players. On the other hand, if the proportion of type 1 players is too low, these players will sometimes exert effort when matched with each other, but will never exert effort when matched with type 0 players. As a result, type 1 players will earn higher payoffs than type 0 players, pushing up the proportion of type 1 players. At equilibrium, type 1 players, when matched with each other, always exert effort, but they also sometimes exert effort when matched with type 0 players. Evolutionary stability, implying that the average payoff of type 1 players equals the average payoff of type 0 players, determines the probability 13 with which type 1 players will exert effort when matched with type 0 players. 20 This probability, together with the proportion of type 1 players in the population also determines total effort.
The Effect of Subsidy on Effort
Assume now that given the positive externalities generated by the players' efforts, the government considers using a subsidy policy designed to encourage individuals to exert more effort. Given a direct subsidy s for exerting effort, player i's utility function becomes: , the evolutionary stable preference profile is
(see proposition 1(iii)). Therefore, we choose to focus on the
region, since in this region total effort depends directly on the equilibrium distribution of preferences.
20 This extended notion of evolutionary stability, where λ is set to attain a rest point of the dynamic process, is not necessary for the analysis. Alternatively, we could arbitrarily fix λ , and have
not as a rest point, in which expected payoffs are identical, but rather as convergence point, such that every deviation will cause the system to converge back to
We divide our discussion into two parts. The first is the traditional short run analysis of the effects of a subsidy policy. In this part the preference profile is given at the equilibrium level of ) (σ q , and we show that subsidization does indeed increase total effort and consequently the level of the public good. We then proceed to the long run analysis in which the distribution of preferences may be affected by the subsidy policy.
For simplicity, we assume that the policy maker is contemplating two possible policies, a no-subsidy policy and a ŝ -level subsidy policy.
The Effect of a Subsidy Policy in the Short Run
We first examine the short run effect of a ŝ -level subsidy assuming a given profile of preferences. We restrict our analysis to low-level subsidies i.e.,
that the subsidy is insufficient to induce type 0 players to exert effort. 21 Hence, the ŝ -level subsidy policy can increase overall effort only by inducing more type 1 players to exert effort.
Proposition 2: When
and given the preference profile ) (σ q , the use of a ŝ -level subsidy policy yields higher total effort in the short run.
The intuition for this result, whose detailed proof is omitted, is as follows: Since γ β − < ŝ , the subsidy has no effect on the behavior of type 0 players. Nor does the subsidy affect the interaction between two type 1 players (in which both players exert effort). When type 1 and type 0 players are matched, recall that without subsidization, at readily verified that all the results continue to hold under this alternative notion of asymptotic stability (for any constant λ ).
equilibrium, type 1 players are indifferent between exerting and not exerting effort, and will exert effort with a certain probability, λ . Adding a subsidy ŝ breaks this indifference. Hence, type 1 will always exert effort, and the overall effort in the economy will increase.
Subsidy Policy with Endogenous Preferences
The subsidy policy affects the relative monetary payoffs of different types of players. Hence, the general payoff monotonic preference dynamics that we described imply that the subsidy policy may affect the final distribution of preferences. The following proposition demonstrates that when preference dynamics are taken into account, a subsidy policy may decrease the share of type 1 players in the population and consequently lower total effort and the level of the public good. 
. Clearly:
(ii) At the new stable equilibrium, induced by the subsidy policy, players of type 1 exert an effort only in ) , ( s σ λ percent of their interactions with type 0 players, where:
We need to show that the total effort induced by the subsidy policy,
, is smaller than the total effort with a no-subsidy policy,
Hence, it is sufficient to show that:
, we obtain, after some rearranging, that condition (9) is equivalent to:
Since the denominator on the left hand side of inequality (9a) is clearly larger than the denominator on the right hand side of the inequality, we focus on the costs (real or political) of funding a subsidy s s> render such a subsidy unattractive if not unfeasible.
numerators. It is easy to confirm that the difference between the numerator on the left hand side of inequality (9a) and the numerator on the right hand side of the inequality is:
Therefore, inequality (9a) holds, and thus
The intuition for this result is as follows: In the zero subsidy benchmark, dynamic stability was obtained through type 1's discriminatory strategy. Type 1 players exert effort whenever they are matched with other type 1 players, but only exert effort with some positive probability when they are matched with type 0 players. The introduction of a subsidy causes type 1 players, in the short run, to exert an effort in all interactions, therefore allowing type 0 players to takes advantage of type 1's generosity and proliferate on her expense. Therefore, the endogenous preference dynamics eventually converge to a new stable preference profile with fewer type 1 players. 22 The decline in the share of socially minded individuals, and the corresponding decrease of social incentives, more than offsets the initial rise in the monetary incentives introduced by the subsidy policy.
The above effect of the subsidy policy may be alternatively stated in terms of a tax policy.
Corollary: When preferences are determined endogenously, a tax policy may be effective in promoting contributions to a public good, and may thus increase the overall level of the public good (independent of any direct spending of the tax revenues on the public good).
Conclusion
The claim that market institutions and government policies may affect the evolution of values and norms of behavior as well as the evolution of preferences has been discussed ever since Alexis de Tocqueville and Karl Marx. 23 The main goal of such claims has been to criticize mainstream economics and its underlying premise of exogenous preferences. There has been no attempt to formally model the implications of this critique for the optimal design of public policy. Moreover, little has been said regarding the precise mechanism through which public policy may affect norms and preferences.
This paper has combined insights from the growing literature on dynamic preference formation into a model of public policy design and has provided an example of a possible formalization of the interdependence between public policy, preferences and norms. Using this formalization, the analysis has demonstrated the possible counterintuitive conclusions that follow from this interdependence.
The study of optimal policy under endogenous preferences clearly reaches beyond the question of subsidizing the accumulation of public goods that was examined in this paper. For instance, the political economy models that study the relationship between elections, voters' preferences and public policy can and should be enriched by an explicit account of the dynamic interaction between policy and preferences. 22 The lower q induces a higher λ in the new stable equilibrium. However, this secondary effect is dominated by the initial change of preferences in favor of the a-social type (type 0). 23 For a historical perspective, see the survey by Bowles (1998) .
Proof of Proposition 1:
(i) Immediate from the equilibrium behavior.
(ii) First, note that type 0 players always
. Hence, we focus on the equilibrium strategies of type 1 players. Given that δ α σ γ β − < < − , consider the following two possible ranges of q:
: Type 1 players never exert effort, and are thus indistinguishable from type 0 players. Therefore, no preference profile in this range is evolutionary stable.
(2) 
